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We take the role of the inferior federal courts in this country for
granted. It seems to us perfectly natural to have independent and
inferior federal courts below the Supreme Court, and a separate
system of state courts. But in fact, our system of parallel state and
federal courts is unusual in a federalism, to put it mildly. In Canada,
for instance, the provincial supreme courts are named by the central
government.' It's as if the judges of the New York Court of Appeals
or the justices of the Connecticut Supreme Court were named by the
President of the United States. In Europe, there are virtually no
inferior European courts. One goes from the national courts of
France, Italy, Germany, and so on, directly to a European High Court,
without (with the possible exception of antitrust) having any lower
European courts.2 In other words, it's as if we had just the courts of
Connecticut, New York, California, and the rest, for all cases, and
then went to our High Court in Washington, D.C.
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and Sterling Professor
of Law Emeritus and Professorial Lecturer, Yale Law School. B.S., 1953, Yale College;
B.A., 1955, Oxford University; LL.B., 1958, Yale Law School; M.A., 1959, Oxford
University. This is the revised text of the thirty-third annual James Madison Lecture on
Constitutional Law delivered at New York University School of Law on October 15, 2002.
1 British North America Act, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 7, § 96 (1867) (Eng.) (establishing struc-
ture of Canadian government).
2 See Treaty on European Union, Dec. 24, 2002, art. 35, http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/
treaties/dat/ECconsol.html#000501 (establishing court of justice and conferring
jurisdiction).
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Parenthetically, it is rather interesting that there's been much talk
in Europe about a political Europe or an economic Europe, but little
talk, until very recently, of a juridical Europe.3 I think that the
Europeans are going to have to consider what kind of a system of
European courts they will want to have as the European Union
develops. There's no need for them to copy the United States or
Canada-one could have any number of different arrangements. One
could, for instance, have judges named locally by Italy, France, or
Germany, who sit in Amsterdam, or in The Hague, or in some other
place. In contrast, the American system names federal judges nation-
ally (with some help from local senators), and these judges then sit
more or less locally. The system of local and national courts can be
different for different federalisms, but each federalism must think
about what kind of relationship it wants to have between the local
courts of the sovereign states and the national courts of the federal
government. Now, let's get back on track (Justice Frankfurter's wife
used to say of him that he had two problems as a public speaker: one,
that he always got off track; and two, that he always got back on).
In the American case, the strange parallel structure of state and
federal courts was first considered at the time our Constitution was
created. Its source, as with so much else, was James Madison. The
idea of separate lower federal courts was Madison's, and Madison
originally wanted the Constitution itself to provide for and grant juris-
diction to lower federal courts, just as it did for the Supreme Court. 4
He lost. But Madison, that pesky little man with such a great mind,
didn't give up easily. And so he suggested that if-someday-it might
be too much work for the Supreme Court to deal with all of the fed-
eral issues that might arise, wouldn't it be useful if, under those cir-
cumstances (should they ever come about), Congress could create
lower federal courts and give them jurisdiction .. if that should ever
happen. And that proposal got through. 5 So the Convention that had
3 Much of the recent discussion has been in conversations, at conferences, with
European scholars. See also Carol Harlow, Voices of Difference in a Plural Community,
50 Am. J. Comp. L. 339 (2002) (arguing for preserving "diversity and legal pluralism within
the EU" as Europe moves toward greater legal harmonization and development of new
institutions); Mel Kenny, Globalization, Interlegality and Europeanized Contract Law, 21
Penn St. Int'l L. Rev. 569, 611-12 (2003) (discussing costs of institutional reform possibili-
ties such as "the regionalization of the EC courts" and "the creation of a new European
Court of Civil law"); J.A.E. Vervaele, Counterfeiting the Single European Currency
(Euro): Towards the Federalization of Enforcement in the European Union?, 8 Colum. J.
Eur. L. 151, 178 (2002) (noting that EU member states "are still unprepared for taking
forceful steps in the direction of justice integration in the EU and the creation of a
European judicial space").
4 1 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 21-22 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
5 Id. at 125, 127.
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rejected the idea of lower federal courts endowed in the Constitution
with a particular jurisdiction, nevertheless allowed Congress to estab-
lish them. 6 Congress did so almost immediately, in 1789, with the
Judiciary Act,7 at the behest of Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut. 8
Whether he was put up to it by Madison or not I do not know, but I
would not be surprised if he were. Thus were the lower federal courts
created.
Over time, the balance between them and the state courts has
changed greatly, but it has always rested on three or four pillars. The
balance I will describe-one which is currently in crisis-is the bal-
ance that I grew up with in law school. It is the balance of some sixty
years ago, the balance, if you will, since Erie,9 and since the coming of
Supreme Court certiorari jurisdiction. 10 It is the balance of the mid-
twentieth century.
What was that balance, why is it in crisis today, and what can we
do about the crisis? I will focus on four aspects of the balance. First,
federal violations-federal actors violating federal rights-were tried
in the lower federal courts. When the federal government allegedly
did something that violated a federal right, constitutional or other-
wise, federal courts were usually involved from the beginning.
Second, criminal law; this was generally local and in state courts.
Third, most private law in traditional common law areas-torts, con-
tracts, and so on-was also in state courts. The exceptions were rela-
tively few diversity cases and, even as to these, after Erie, local law
ruled. 1' And last, there were state violations-state actors allegedly
violating federal rights. In this area, regardless of what had been the
case earlier, starting about sixty years ago, such cases were often tried
out first, or reviewed de novo, in federal courts. One didn't count on
the Supreme Court reviewing state court decisions on these issues:
Federal courts were able to find the facts and decide questions of law,
preparing them for the Supreme Court should that court wish to hear
them.
Of these four pillars of federal-state court relations, I will argue
that three-those involving criminal law, private law, and state viola-
tions-are currently in crisis, if not crumbling, and I will make some
6 U.S. Const. art. IlI, § 1.
7 Judiciary Act of 1789, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 41
(2000)).
8 See William R. Casto, The Supreme Court in the Early Republic: The Chief Justice-
ships of John Jay and Oliver Ellsworth 27-53 (1995).
9 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
10 Certiorari jurisdiction was established in the Judiciary Act of 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-
415, 43 Stat. 936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
11 Erie, 304 U.S. at 79-80.
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rather radical, and some less radical, suggestions for reasserting or
reconstructing them.
I
THE FIRST PILLAR IN CRISIS: CRIMINAL LAW
We all know that, increasingly in the last sixty years, criminal law
of the ordinary sort has become federalized. Every time Congress
meets, it passes a new law, or new laws, or many new laws, declaring
actions that are already state crimes-acts parallel to those already
prohibited by the states and punished by the states-to be federal
crimes as well. 12 Why is that so? Because it is politically successful.
When people are upset by some behavior, it is very easy for Congress
to say, "We will make it a federal crime." And Congress uses the
Commerce Clause, or it uses the Banana Clause, or it uses some other
clause to do so.1 3
This has been happening again and again, even in the face of
some resistance. For instance, the Supreme Court has tried to limit
this tendency in the Lopez line of cases. 14 But that approach hasn't
really stopped the trend. And I don't think it will in the future.
My colleague, Dennis Jacobs, who is here this evening, recently
dissented in a case involving the Hobbs Act,15 saying, in effect, "It
can't go that far, for heaven's sake, or we can make everything a
Hobbs Act crime."' 6 But the majority, also represented here today,
12 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (2000) (arson); § 1951 (robbery, extortion).
13 See, e.g., United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 190-91 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that
statute prohibiting private violence motivated by victim's race, religion, or other discrimi-
natory reason is constitutional exercise of Congress's power under section two of Thir-
teenth Amendment because of victim's use of public facility); see also Yakus v. United
States, 321 U.S. 414, 422, 444 (1944) (noting that War Powers Clause, U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8,
gives Congress constitutional authority to prescribe commodity prices and to criminalize
sale of commodities at higher prices as war emergency measure). See generally Edward D.
Re, Federal-State Relations: The Allocation and Distribution of Powers of Government in
the United States, 15 St. Thomas L. Rev. 265, 276-83 (2002) (discussing Congress's power
to legislate using Commerce Clause).
14 See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 850-51 (2000) (holding that federal
arson statute, 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (2000), if applied to arson of owner-occupied residence
not used for any commercial purposes, would exceed Congress's Commerce Clause
powers); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601-02 (2000) (holding that Violence
Against Women Act's regulation of intrastate noneconomic activity exceeds Congress's
Commerce Clause powers); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 936-40 (1997) (Thomas,
J., concurring) (noting that Congress lacks power under Commerce Clause to regulate
"wholly intrastate, point-of-sale transactions"); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551
(1995) (holding that Gun-Free School Zones Act exceeds Congress's Commerce Clause
powers).
15 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2000).
16 See United States v. Jamison, 299 F.3d 114, 121-23 (2d Cir. 2002) (Jacobs, J.,
dissenting).
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said "No. That's what Congress can do. It's a Commerce Clause thing
and there it iS. '1 7 In the end, Lopez-type approaches, whether by
courts of appeals or by the Supreme Court, cannot solve the problem
because any solutions that would prohibit the federal government
from making some of these things federal crimes either don't go far
enough to keep the federalization of criminal law from overwhelming
us, or go so far as to restrain the federal government from taking
actions in areas where only the federal government can act effectively.
It's a game attempt, but it simply does not work. That people-
even those who push for it-don't believe that it can work can be
readily seen. Thus, some legislators who hailed the Supreme Court's
restriction on criminalizing, as a federal matter, certain types of
behavior-violence against women, 18 for example-are the very ones
who proposed that Congress pass a law prohibiting what they call par-
tial-birth abortions. 19 Now one can feel however one wants about
these abortions-about whether they are good or bad-but if one
believes that there is no constitutionally valid federal interest in
prohibiting violence against women under the Commerce Clause, it is
very hard to understand what the valid federal interest is in banning
this type of abortion. It is hard to understand because, in fact, people
want contradictory things. They want the federal government to make
criminal those things they believe to be deeply wrong, and (at the
same time) they worry about the federalization of criminal law.
Apart from the dramatic change that such federalization effects
in our federal system, making criminal law national rather than local
causes great problems for the lower federal courts. I would guess that
cases that involve federal criminal law, where there is already a state
criminal law that would cover the same thing, total somewhere
between thirty and fifty percent of the Second Circuit's appellate
docket, depending on how you define that docket and those cases.
Most of the drug cases, of course, fall into that category. If the federal
courts are overwhelmed-with the result that they become ever
larger, and inevitably of lower quality, all of the problems that Judge
Newman spoke of in his review of the situation of federal courts sev-
eral years ago 20-it is preeminently due to this. What, then, can we do?
17 See id. at 118-19 (majority opinion by Leval, J., with which McLaughlin, J., con-
curred) (noting Second Circuit's conclusion that Supreme Court's decision in Lopez does
"not raise the de minimis threshold for satisfying the jurisdictional element of the Hobbs
Act" (citing United States v. Arena, 180 F.3d 380, 389-90 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v.
Farrish, 122 F.3d 146, 148 (2d Cir. 1997))).
18 See Morrison, 529 U.S. 598.
19 See, e.g., Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, S. 3, 108th Cong. (2003) (passed);
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, H.R. 760, 108th Cong. (2003) (passed).
20 See Jon 0. Newman, Remarks Given at a Panel Discussion on "Legal Issues in the
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Well, here's a possible solution.2' Suppose Congress were to pass
a law that said that whenever a federal crime parallels a state crime,
both crimes will be tried, together, in state courts. Federal prosecu-
tors are available, the FBI can investigate, but the power to try out the
case in the first instance-the jurisdiction-will lie not in federal
courts, but in state courts. Some of you will say "Brady" 22 and say
that it is unconstitutional to assign federal duties to the state courts,
and so on. But Brady doesn't apply to courts: It applies to everything
else but courts, as various Supreme Court decisions during the Second
World War, as well as postwar Office of Price Administration cases,
have made clear.
23
Since Congress can assign criminal cases under federal law to
state courts, suppose that Congress were to say: State courts are
where such cases will be tried. The federal government could
continue to make all sorts of things federal crimes. And it could, if it
wanted, demand that the penalties be more severe than those man-
21st Century" at the Fifty-Seventh Judicial Conference of the Third Circuit in Philadelphia,
Pa. (May, 15, 1997), in 70 Temp. L. Rev. 1125, 1128-29 (1997).
21 It is one that might also do away with such small abominations as dual sovereignty-
double jeopardy, which become ever more possible when there are ever more things that
are both federal crimes and state crimes. I mention this because that was the abomination
that Justice Black was particularly concerned with in the 1958 Term when I was clerking for
him. As he predicted, correctly, see Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 163-64 (Black, J.,
dissenting), dual sovereignty-double jeopardy is used especially in cases that are politically
hot-when the person who had been acquitted is politically unpopular-whether from the
right or the left. See, e.g., United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 2002) (involving
federal civil rights conviction of African American youth who had been acquitted in state
court of murder charges arising from death of Orthodox Jewish man during racially moti-
vated riot); United States v. Koon, 833 F. Supp. 769 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (involving federal
civil rights conviction of officers who had been acquitted in state court of charges arising
from their beating of Rodney King).
22 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that Brady Act violates
Tenth Amendment by imposing obligation on state officers to execute federal laws).
23 See, e.g., Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947) (holding that Rhode Island courts
cannot decline jurisdiction over claim under Emergency Price Control Act where courts
otherwise "have jurisdiction adequate and appropriate under established local law to adju-
dicate this action"); Miles v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 315 U.S. 698, 703-04 (1942) (stating that where
Congress conferred concurrent jurisdiction on state courts to enforce Federal Employers'
Liability Act (FELA) and prohibited removal of actions brought in state courts, "opportu-
nity to present causes of action arising under the F.E.L.A. in the state courts came ... from
[ ] federal" law, and therefore, "the courts of the several states must remain open to such
litigants on the same basis that they are open to litigants with causes of action springing
from a different source" because "the Federal Constitution makes the laws of the United
States the supreme law of the land, binding on every citizen and every court and enforce-
able wherever jurisdiction is adequate for the purpose"); see also Mondou v. N.Y., New
Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 59 (1912) ("[R]ights arising under [FELA] may be
enforced, as of right, in the courts of the states when their jurisdiction, as prescribed by
local laws, is adequate to the occasion.").
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dated by state laws. But, as a practical matter, the power to try such
federal crimes would revert to local government.
Of course there might be some cases where such an approach
wouldn't work. I would want to allow either party to petition the fed-
eral court (maybe the district court, maybe the court of appeals) to
have such a special case be tried in a federal court. The petition
would presumably be granted only if there was some reason to think
the state court couldn't handle the case. And I would also want to
have a system of certification so that if, in the course of trying out a
case that seemingly could be heard as well in the state court, some
unsettled question of complicated federal law arose, the state court
could certify that issue to the federal court of appeals. And the court
of appeals could accept "the question" and give back an answer as to
the applicable federal law.
24
If Congress were to pass such a law, then thirty to fifty percent of
the Second Circuit's appellate docket would disappear. And the trial
of matters that are basically local-even though Congress wanted to
impose a higher or a different penalty-would return to the way that
they were treated from Madison's time until a few years ago.25 Inci-
dentally, this might also mean that federal judges-who are generally
not picked for their knowledge of criminal law, while state judges
much more often are-could return to the solemn duty of dealing with
securities cases, which we handled so well in Learned Hand's time.
II
THE SECOND PILLAR IN CRISIS: PRIVATE LAW
In a national economy, the existence of diversity and pendent
jurisdiction has meant that more and more cases are being tried in
federal courts, even though the issue is one of local law. There are
whole areas of law-certain aspects of intellectual property law, for
example-that are not governed directly by federal law, but which are
in federal courts because they are pendent to federal laws. In such
areas, federal courts are supposed to state what the law of, say, New
York is. As a result, in these areas, the law of New York is the law
made by Second Circuit Judges like Jon Newman and Pierre Leval. It
is made spectacularly well, perhaps. But this is supposed to be local
24 Naturally, such certification would have to be structured so that the federal courts
would decide only cases and controversies and not give advisory opinions. But that should
be readily doable.
25 Obviously, if Congress were to pass such a law, it would be wise to grant states the
funds to take on the additional cases. But given the relative costs of federal and state
courts, it could easily do so in ways that would be financially advantageous both to the
federal and local fiscs, and especially to the state courts.
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law, articulated by state judges, not by federal courts. The same is
even more true in diversity cases dealing with torts and contracts, for
the presence of national companies frequently leads to federal
jurisdiction.
The problem here is that federal courts often get state law wrong
because federal judges don't know state law and are not the ultimate
decisionmakers on it. Inevitably, this leads to considerable forum
shopping of just the sort that Erie sought to avoid.2 6 One party or the
other tries to get into federal courts because it hopes that the federal
courts will get the law wrong.27 I could give you any number of exam-
ples. For instance, the concept of duty in the tort law of New York is
virtually unique to New York and is very complicated. As a result,
federal judges who deal with the concept of duty in a New York tort
case frequently get it wrong. They may be right in thinking that what
they hold is what New York law ought to be, but it ain't New York
law!
One answer to this problem is the one favored by quite a few
federal judges: Simply get rid of diversity jurisdiction. Judge
Feinberg, among others, has argued for that.28 I'm against it. I'm
against it for several reasons: First, I do not believe that the problem
of the level playing field, which was the original reason for the crea-
tion of diversity jurisdiction, has ceased to exist. I think that it mat-
ters, if you are a citizen of New York, whether your case will be tried
in a Texas state court or in a federal court, or, if you are a citizen of
Texas, whether your case will be tried in a New York state court or in
a federal court. If you're not a citizen of that state, I think, especially
at the lower court level, that it makes a difference what the court is.29
If you think of France and Germany it's perfectly obvious, but I think
that it remains true in this country as well. And I believe it would
26 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1938).
27 Charles E. Clark, a predecessor of mine both as Yale Law School dean and on the
Second Circuit, predicted this in an article he wrote soon after Erie. Charles E. Clark,
State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55
Yale L.J. 267, 290-94 (1946). What Clark was most worried about was the forum shopping
that would occur if federal courts were required to follow old or dubious state court prece-
dents. Because certification was not around at the time he wrote, and because he, cor-
rectly, viewed abstention as too cumbersome, Clark urged federal courts to be more
flexible in their reading of state law. Absent certification, this seemed to him the best way
to avoid having federal courts get state law wrong.
28 See Wilfred Feinberg, Is Diversity Jurisdiction an Idea Whose Time Has Passed?,
N.Y. St. B.J., July 1989, at 14.
29 See, e.g., Pappas v. Middle Earth Condo. Ass'n, 963 F.2d 534, 539-41 (2d Cir. 1992)
(holding that allowing defense counsel's statements designed to appeal to jury's regional
bias in negligence action was reversible error and noting that original rationale for diver-
sity jurisdiction-"fear that state courts would be prejudiced against out-of-state liti-
gants"-"retain[s] validity").
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matter even more if there weren't the "out" of diversity. The fact that
people can go into a federal court, and avoid potential prejudice,
makes the state courts a little more careful.
But there's another reason to keep diversity jurisdiction, and that
is that diversity has an important unifying effect on the law. Federal
courts tend to look to national law in these areas. When, on state law
issues, judges like Newman or Leval focus on what the law is or
should be, they are guided by the law all over the country, and that is
a useful thing. National law shouldn't be the last word as to the state
law, but having courts that are keenly aware of national law speak
about state law does have a unifying effect, which it would be too bad
to lose.
Well, what's the answer? My long-suffering colleagues know
what my answer is, and that is certify, certify, certify.30 In other
words, I believe that whenever there is a question of state law that is
even possibly in doubt, the federal courts should send the question to
the highest court of the state, and let the highest court of the state
decide the issue as it wishes. Federal judges don't like to certify,
because we think we know, better than the states, what state law
ought to be. But that isn't the point. We should be humble. We
should realize that it is state law, and hence that it is up to the states.
Moreover, we should recognize that the parties have a right to have
state, rather than federal, judges decide issues of state law. If we are
unwilling to certify frequently-indeed to certify almost all the time-
then a more radical solution would be to have Congress pass a law
allowing the parties to petition the highest court of the state to review,
if it chooses, a decision on state law made by the federal courts of
appeals. I don't think that that should be necessary, if we would just
do our job of certifying. But it is a solution if we don't.
Where does that put federal appellate courts? I think that in
cases of this sort, the intermediate federal courts should be no more
than the "Appellate Division for Diversity Cases." We should think
of ourselves as an intermediate state court whose function it is to
decide provisionally, and let the highest court of the state ultimately
determine state law. When I say that, I talk about a kind of certifica-
tion that is quite different from the one that we are used to. What
federal judges should do, if state law is uncertain, is write an opinion
which says what we think that law ought to be. We should write an
30 See, e.g., Mark A. Varrichio & Assocs. v. Chi. Ins. Co., 312 F.3d 544, 548-50 (2d Cir.
2002) (certifying uncertain question of state law to New York Court of Appeals); Tri-State
Employment Servs., Inc. v. Mountbatten Sur. Co., 295 F.3d 256, 269 (2d Cir. 2002) (same);
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Serio, 261 F.3d 143, 149-54 (2d Cir. 2001) (same); Henderson v. INS,
157 F.3d 106, 123-24 (2d Cir. 1998) (same).
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opinion of the same sort that the state's appellate division would
write. And then we should certify, so that the New York Court of
Appeals is able to decide (1) not to take the case, if it thinks that we
are right, or if it is not ready to take the issue up, or if it just doesn't
want to bother to take it at that time; or (2) to take it, if it likes, in
exactly the same way it does cases brought up (on certiorari, essen-
tially) from the appellate division.
If federal judges did that, if we had that structural view of our
role, then we would not be insulted when the New York Court of
Appeals declines certification. Now, when the New York Court of
Appeals declines certification, some federal judges walk around
saying, "What did they do to us? After all, we are the Second Circuit,
they should listen to us!" My view is exactly the opposite. We have
indicated how we would decide something, or simply explicated our
doubts on the issue. If the state's highest court doesn't want to take it,
great! That gives us authority to impose our view of state law, provi-
sionally, until the highest court of the state decides to resolve the
question.
Such an approach would also avoid the problem of delay, which is
one reason why many federal judges don't like to certify. The only
cases that would be delayed are the ones that the New York Court of
Appeals decided were worth taking: in other words, those that it
deemed important for a state court to decide. The others, it would
simply decline to take. And, since it doesn't take more than a month
or two for the New York Court of Appeals to say, "Thank you, we
decline" (as it does frequently with the appellate division), no signifi-
cant delay would occur. Such a view of certification would, moreover,
preserve the unifying function of diversity jurisdiction. We on the
Second Circuit would still be in a position to speak to national law,
and could put before the New York Court of Appeals, or the
Connecticut or Vermont Supreme Courts, what we think the law
ought to be, given the more national vision that our court likely has.
But the state high court could then accept our view or not, as it
wishes.
Frequent certification would also have another advantage, which
is very important in terms of the third pillar of the federal-state court
balance now in crisis. It would have us act humbly in our relationship
to the New York, Vermont, or Connecticut courts-to the state courts.
These courts would realize that where it is their responsibility, and
their law, we understand that we have no special expertise at all-that
we are an intermediate court in their system, subject to them. And
that would be extremely useful for the last point that I want to make.
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III
THE THIRD PILLAR IN CRISIS: STATE ACTION
Some sixty or seventy years ago, cases involving state action that
(allegedly or possibly) violated federal rights, instead of being tried
out primarily in the states, with a review of the federal claim only at
the Supreme Court, increasingly came to be tried in the lower federal
courts. Some people thought that this occurred in reaction to massive
resistance in the south, when some southern states attempted not to
follow the Supreme Court's desegregation orders.31 And this was cer-
tainly one of the circumstances behind the popularity of that
approach, but massive resistance was only a contingent reason for it.
The real reason why it became essential for lower federal courts to
hear these cases was that the Supreme Court had decided to take
fewer cases after the advent of certiorari jurisdiction. 32 As a practical
matter, it was impossible for the Supreme Court adequately to police
state courts to see whether state actions violated federal rights, and
that made it essential for lower federal courts to hear such cases. 33 A
hundred cases a year cannot test whether what the states are doing
adequately protects federal rights.
The need for such federal fact and law finding increased for
another related reason: The same thing that had happened with
review from state high courts to the U.S. Supreme Court was also hap-
pening within the states. The New York Court of Appeals and the
Connecticut Supreme Court, for example, were now hearing a very
small proportion of the appeals from the decisions of the lower state
courts.34 And many of the appeals that the state high courts took,
understandably, involved state issues which these courts felt they had
to deal with. So, if there weren't a way-in lower federal courts-of
31 Commentators have argued that the Supreme Court's decision in Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167 (1961), reinterpreting the phrase "under color of state law" and thereby
opening lower federal courts to many more lawsuits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000), "rested
upon a fundamental distrust of state courts to protect federal rights." Barry Friedman, A
Revisionist Theory of Abstention, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 530, 539 (1989).
32 See Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five
Years After the Judges' Bill, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1643, 1646 & n.12 (2000) (collecting cita-
tions showing that, prior to passage of Judiciary Act of 1925, Court heard more than 300
cases per year).
33 See, e.g., Barry Friedman, A Tale of Two Habeas, 73 Minn. L. Rev. 247, 253-54
(1988) ("[TJhe Court expanded the scope of the writ of habeas corpus ... because the
Court recognized that it no longer could shoulder the burden on direct review of scruti-
nizing constitutional claims arising in state criminal proceedings.").
34 See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-197f (2003) (giving Connecticut Supreme Court discre-
tionary review in general); Conn. Gen. Stat. §51-199 (2003) (enumerating small class of
cases that Connecticut Supreme Court must hear); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5602 (McKinney 2003)
(giving New York Court of Appeals discretionary review in general).
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protecting federal rights from state action, it would be the lowest
courts of the state, or perhaps the appellate divisions, that would be
charged with the awesome task of protecting federal constitutional
rights. That did not, and cannot, work.
The intermediate courts of any state have other things that they
must be more concerned with. They are not experts on federal law
and, with great respect to them, they are not good at it. Moreover,
they are not all that interested in federal law, nor should they be. The
result was that for some sixty years, through section 1983 actions,
through declaratory judgment actions, through habeas petitions,
through any number of other devices, lower federal courts got into the
business of deciding these cases either in the first instance or essen-
tially de novo.
35
Recently that's all changed. We now have any number of rules,
judicial and statutory, that make it difficult for lower federal courts
seriously to review state actions allegedly in violation of federal
rights. 36 There are three reasons for the change. First, the state courts
started feeling insulted by the fact that the federal courts were
deciding these issues and telling state courts that they were wrong.
State judges got mad and hurt and in effect said, "Who are they to tell
us how to do our job?" Notice that this is the other side of federal
judges' lack of humility with respect to state law. It would be very
different if federal judges said, "We are federal judges, we have more
knowledge of federal law. You are state judges, you have more
knowledge of state law. Let each of us do our job and not be
insulted."
The second reason for the change is the converse of the role
southern states played in bringing about first-instance consideration of
these cases in federal courts. Today, rather than criticizing southern
resistance and implying that there is a need for greater federal court
oversight, commentators talk about how the Ninth Circuit and other
federal courts are "running wild" and "going too far" in protecting
federal rights. 37 But that is the same kind of contingent argument,
35 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (2000) (declaratory judgments); 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994)
(amended 1996) (habeas corpus); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000); see, e.g., Douglas v. Green, 363
U.S. 192 (1960) (reversing district court's denial of writ of habeas corpus); see also supra
notes 31 & 33 and accompanying text.
36 See, e.g., Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); Prison
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18, 28 & 42 U.S.C.); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310
(1989).
37 See, e.g., Editorial, One Nation, Under Zeus, Wall St. J., June 27, 2002, at A20
(deploring Ninth Circuit's ruling that recitation of Pledge of Allegiance in public schools
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intimately connected to the political climate of a particular era, and it
is no more fundamental or generalizable than was the opposite argu-
ment based on southern resistance.
The third reason for criticizing the heavy involvement of lower
federal courts in such civil rights cases is a more serious one. In acting
in these cases, federal courts were in an unusual role. They were
dealing with federal law issues, of course, but often they were dealing
with naked federal issues. That is, a federal constitutional right was
involved, but it came up starkly, rather than arising in the course of a
total litigation. For example, the case in federal court might involve
the interpretation of a state statute which might, or rihight not, violate
a federal law, depending on how it was construed. Was public nude
photography permitted in New York?38 What kinds of restrictions on
assisting suicide did New York provide? 39 These were state statutes,
the constitutionality of which, on the basis of a hypothetical interpre-
tation of the statute's meaning, federal courts were called on to
decide. In this respect, federal courts were in a position more akin to
European constitutional courts, which are regularly called on collater-
ally to decide "neat" constitutional questions.
Contrast those cases with what federal courts do when an analo-
gous issue comes up under a federal statute. Any number of delaying,
avoiding, Bickelian passive-virtue tactics 40 are then available. The
federal court can, for example, interpret the federal statute to avoid
the constitutional issue. It has full control of the case and can slow
down the constitutional question, the question of the fundamental
right, until it is mature and ready for decision. Federal courts do this
almost without thinking about it in fully federal cases; it is second
nature. When federal courts get similar cases from a state, however, it
is hard for them to do the same thing.41
violates Establishment Clause of First Amendment); George F. Will, Court of Silliness
Strikes Again, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Nov. 8, 2001, at B6.
38 See Tunick v. Safir, 209 F.3d 67, 68 (2d Cir. 2000) (certifying to New York Court of
Appeals question of whether photographic shoot involving 75 to 100 nude models arranged
in abstract formation on public street qualifies under exemptions to statutory ban on public
nudity for entertainment or performance in "play, exhibition, show or entertainment";
whether such exemptions are limited to indoor activities; and, if exemptions do not apply
to such activity or apply only to such activity conducted indoors, whether statutes banning
public nudity so interpreted violate New York Constitution).
39 See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 732 (2d Cir. 1996) (Calabresi, J., concurring) (noting
that New York Court of Appeals had never clarified, and legislative history cast some
doubt upon, question of whether New York ban on assisted suicide, first enacted in 1828,
was "ever meant to apply to a treating physician"), rev'd, 521 U.S. 793.
40 See Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Foreword: The Passive
Virtues, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 40, 49 (1961) (advocating judicial restraint through use of such
tactics as interpreting statutes so as to avoid constitutional issues).
41 It is hard at least in part because it seems "grabby" for the federal court to say what
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I believe that federal judges have to learn how to deal with state
laws and state actions in the same prudent fashion they use for federal
ones. Otherwise, they will be too aggressive, and states will properly
get mad. Again, there are ways, and certification is one. The
Supreme Court told the lower federal courts, in Arizonans for Official
English v. Arizona,42 that they should ask the state's highest court to
interpret the relevant statute before deciding on its constitutionality.
Suppose, in the assisted suicide case, 43 that instead of deciding the
case, and instead of having the Supreme Court decide the case, the
Second Circuit had certified to the New York Court of Appeals the
question of whether the New York law prohibiting assisted suicide (a)
meant assisted suicide of somebody who was already dying, and (b)
applied to doctors assisting suicide. Do we know what the New York
Court of Appeals would have done? It is quite possible that the New
York Court of Appeals would have interpreted the New York statute
in a way that would have caused the whole issue of federal rights over
state action to disappear. If that had been a federal statute, I do not
doubt that a federal court of appeals would have done an awful lot of
statutory interpretation before reaching any constitutional issue.
Once again, the state court might decline certification. But then
the federal court would be free to interpret the state statute itself to
avoid or delay the constitutional issue. Indeed, that is, desirably I
think, what can be said to have happened in the nude photography
case. 4
4
Certification is not the only technique for "slowing down" such
cases. Federal courts should read the decisions of European constitu-
tional courts, which have developed many methods for handling, with
nuance and care, overly stark constitutional questions. 45 I would like
federal courts to learn from these European courts that, when the
question is one of a state statute or of state behavior, there exist any
number of ways in addition to certification that can make plenary fed-
eral review less brittle. If our courts did this, it would become more
acceptable to return to a system in which issues of federal rights are
tried out first in federal courts, even when they involve state action.
the state statute means. Grabby and to some extent academic, since the state court can
later on give the same statute a totally different reading.
42 520 U.S. 43, 76-79 (1997).
43 See Quill, 80 F.3d 716.
44 See Tunick v. Safir, 228 F.3d 135, 136-37 (2d Cir. 2000). But see id. at 137 (Sack, J.,
concurring); Tunick v. Safir, 209 F.3d 67, 90-100 (2d Cir. 2000) (Sack, J., concurring).
45 See United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 468-69 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J., concur-
ring) (describing German and Italian courts' practice of announcing when laws are
"heading toward unconstitutionality" and citing sources).
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Such a return is as necessary now as it was sixty years ago,
because it remains the case that the Supreme Court of the United
States is not in a position adequately to protect those rights, and
neither are the highest courts of the states. All of these courts can
only take very few cases. And if such alleged rights are to be ade-
quately examined and, where appropriate, protected, plenary consid-
eration in lower federal courts is essential.
IV
RESTORING THE BALANCE
What, then, is the new and workable balance that I propose? I
could talk a lot more about it, and give many details, but for purposes
of this lecture a short summary is enough:
1. Federal claims: Jurisdiction in cases asserting federal
rights against federal actors need not be changed. Such suits
are properly in federal court and remain there currently, as
do civil claims under federal statutes.
2. Criminal law: These cases usually belong in state courts,
even if they involve federal crimes, so long as the crime is
parallel to one that exists in the state. Reverse certification
to federal courts is encouraged if a separate and undecided
federal question arises.
3. Private law: Federal courts are the "appellate division"
for diversity cases and other cases involving state laws. Cer-
tification to the states is, therefore, called for .. after the
federal court has indicated how it would decide the case if
certification is refused. The state courts are then free to
accept certification or not as they choose.
4. Federal rights against state actors: De novo or original
consideration in federal courts is appropriate, with certifica-
tion to states for state law interpretation and with frequent
use of European-style passive virtues applied to such "collat-
eral" constitutional reviews. (I am here incorporating by ref-
erence, because I don't have time to describe them tonight,
the many devices by which the European constitutional
courts avoid deciding constitutional questions too soon.)4 6
46 I have noted some of these devices in Then:
Both the Constitutional Courts of Germany and Italy have addressed the
problem of laws that were rational when enacted, but which, over time, have
become increasingly dubious. Rather than jumping in and striking the laws
down, or leaving them undisturbed and thereby allowing legislative inertia to
dominate, these Courts have found a middle ground. They have, in a few
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The effect of these changes would be that each set of courts
would do what it knows and does best; that local dominance in tradi-
tionally local areas would be reestablished, and that federal domi-
nance, when issues of federal rights are involved, would also be
reestablished; and that each set of courts would learn that it is not a
matter of "who is better than whom," but rather that each should be
humble about acknowledging the existence of areas as to which it
knows less than other courts. (It is not insulting to be humble about
the things that one doesn't know as much as others do.) Moreover, if
we did these things, there would be what economists, with their usual
infelicity of phrase, would term significant "external benefits." Fed-
eral dockets would be reduced and this would reinforce the unique
position of the federal courts of appeals; the position that makes being
a judge on a federal court of appeals such a wonderful job.
It would make courts such as mine the court of last resort in all
sorts of cases involving federal issues. (This is so whenever we can be
confident that the Supreme Court is not interested, and hence that
what we say governs.) In such situations, which is most of the time,
we would write the kind of opinion that is suitable to a court of last
resort. At other times, we are an intermediate federal court. This
occurs in situations in which we believe that the Supreme Court will
take the case. It is then our job to write a menu for that Court-to
write not as final decisionmakers, but instead to canvass all the pos-
sible ways in which the case should come out-so that the Supreme
Court, when it takes the case, gets not only a result from us, but all the
different possible approaches among which it might choose. Finally,
in many cases involving local law, we are an intermediate state court.
We then must readily yield to the state courts on state law. But we
can give our opinion of what that law is, based both on local law
precedents, and on what other states do in like cases. We can in such
situations speak to what we think state law ought to be, but always
adding, "On this, we are a lower court, and it is up to you, higher state
courts, to decide."
Three different hats, in one court. What a challenge. What fun.
Madison would smile, I think. Thank you.
cases, announced that laws, because of changed circumstances, were heading
toward unconstitutionality.
Id.; see also Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal
Republic of Germany 60-61 & n.118 (1989) (chronicling cases and explaining that Consti-
tutional Court of Germany utilizes this technique most often for "equal-protection
claims ... to give the legislature time to adjust to changing conditions"); Christian Beck
Pestalozza, Verfassungsprozessrecht: die Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit des Bundes und der
Lander: mit einem Anhang zum internationalen Rechtsschutz § 20, at 337 & n.313 (3d ed.
1991) (describing German practice and citing cases).
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